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Growth of Manufacturing Capital, 1880-1948
Thedevelopment of manufacturing industries is a familiar story in
terms of output and employment,22 and the broad outlines of the story
are not altered when it is told in terms of the stock of capital. For this
reason we show only two measures of the development of manufactur-
ing industries since 1880. One is a measure of the annual rate of change
between benchmark years of book value of total capital expressed in
1929 prices in all manufacturing industries and in the 15 major group-
ings (Chart 1 and Table 4).
TABLE4
Dates of Troughs and Peaks in Secular Swings in Gross National Product





Level per Worker Capital average, %)
(1) (2) (3)
Trough 1873
Peak 1884 1880-1890 +8.8
Trough 1892 1890-1900 +5.3
Peak 1903 1900-1904 +6.5
Trough 1912 1909-1914 +3.0
Peak 1926 1914-1919 +4.6
Trough 1932 1929-1937 —1.6
Peak 1945 1937-1948 +3.7
Source:
Column1Simon Küznets, "Swings in the Rate of Secular Growth," Work Memo-
randum No. 37, p. 19, Table 6 (mimeographed, National Bureau of
Economic Research, March 1952).
2 & 3 Table 5 of this paper.
See, for example, two monographs by Solomon Fabricant, TheOutput of Manu-
facturingIndustries, 1899-1937 and Employment in Manufacturing, 1899-1939
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31As one would expect, the highest annual rate of growth (geometric
average) of the stock of manufacturing capital occurred during 1880-
1890, the first decade covered by the statistics, when modern manufac-
turing in general was emerging from its earlier beginnings, although
some part of this rise must be attributed to the under-reporting of
capital in 1880. The annual rate of growth has tended to decrease as
we approach the present period.23 However, it would be wrong to infer
from this that the rate of growth decreases continuously and never
reverses itself. Certainly, in the case of the stock of capital there have
been alternating periods of relatively high and low rates of increase.
The downward drift results from the fact that each succeeding peak
rate and each succeeding trough rate are at lower levels.
The dating of these alternating periods cannot be determined pre-
cisely with our data since we are restricted to average annual per-
centage changes between benchmark years. Despite this crudity, the
evidence suggests that the alternating periods of relatively high and low
rates of increase in capital stock coincide with relatively high and low
rates of increase in the economy's output as measured by gross national
product (GNP) per worker in 1929 prices (Table 4). The noncoinci-
dence of the 1926 peak in GNP per worker and the relatively high rate
of manufacturing capital in 1914-1919 is more apparent than real. If
the latter figure for 1914, for example, were extrapolated by Chawner's
estimates of capital expenditures for manufacturing plant and equip-
ment in constant prices for the years the long-term peak
based on a nine-year moving average computed from the resulting
annual estimates would appear in 1926.
The existence of alternating periods of relatively high and low rates
of change in the capital stock is another complicating factor in any
projection of the current rate of growth into the future. It is essential
that the estimator establish whether the current rate represents a rela-
tively high or low position in the long swings in accumulated capital.
How pervasive is this pattern of alternating periods of high and
If we assume that the capital estimates are more and more net of depreciation as
we move forward from 1880 to 1919, this would have a damping effect on the rate
of growth; if the opposite has been true, which we doubt, the rate of growth has
beenexaggerated.
24Surveyof Current Business, March 1941, p. 11.
32low rates of expansion? Is the pattern for total manufacturing capital
a result of averaging diverse or similar chronologies? An answer is sug-
gested by comparing the chronology of the long swings in each of the
15 major groups with the chronology for all manufacturing industries
(Tables 5 and 6). A date in parentheses indicates that the turning
point for a given industry group differs from that for all manufacturing.
In only 2 of the 15 major industry groups, leather and leather prod-
ucts and machinery, are the chronologies of the secular swings identical
with the one for all manufacturing. Differences in timing occur most
frequently between 1890 and 1919. Only two industry groups failed to
show a peak rate of growth between 1880 and 1890, and only one
failed to show a low rate of change between 1929 and 1937. On the
other hand, all industry groups developed at a relatively high rate
between 1937 and 1948. Extended swings due to prolonged expansions
occurred in two industry groups related to the revolution in road trans-
portation: transportation equipment, which includes automobiles, and
rubber products. In these industries expansion was initiated in 1900-
1904 and continued until 1914-1919. Other groups that reached a
peak during the World War I period rather than in the twenties were
petroleum refining, the metal industries, textiles, and leather products
—allindustries in which substantial military orders were added to
regular civilian demands. Those groups closely connected with building
construction —suchas forest products and stone, clay, and glass prod-
ucts —weredepressed during World War I, since these activities had
a low priority, but were booming during the twenties when restrictions
were removed.25
Thus the development of manufacturing has not always proceeded
at an even pace, and at certain periods some branches of manufactur-
ing have lagged behind and others have forged ahead. This uneven rate
of growth is shown by our second measure of relative changes in manu-
facturing development. For selected benchmark years, total capital in
each minor industry is expressed as a per cent of total capital in all
In Clarence Long's investigation there is a trough in 1917.1919 and a subsequent
peak in 1924-1927. (Building Cycles and the Theory of Investment [Princeton TJni-
versity Press, 1940], p. 136, Table 11, quoted in Simon Kuznets' "Swings in the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Per Cent Distribution of Total Capital (1929 Prices)








All manufacturing industries 100 100 100 100 100
1.Food & kindred products 18.520.616.4 14.6 14.2
Bakery & confectionery
products 1.0 1.5 2.4 1.6
Canned products 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.5
Mill products 6.7 2.5 2.1 1.0
Packing house products 1.8 2.5 3.1 1.8
Sugar refining 1.0 2.7 1.2 0.7
Liquor & beverages 5.0 6.7 2.0 2.8 2.8
Nonalcoholic beverages0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7
Malt liquors & malt 3.9 5.9 1.6 1.0
Wines 0.1 0.1
b 0.1
Distilled liquors 0.9 0.4 0.1 1.0
Tobacco products 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.1
Other food products 1.2 2.5 3.0 3.0
2.Textiles & their products 20.616.414.5 9.2 9.0
Cotton goods 8.4 6.3 5.0
Silk&rayongoods 0.7 1.0 1.2 -
Woolen& worsted goods4.0 3.2 2.0
Carpets, floor coverings, etc. 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4
Knit goods 0.6 1.0 1.2 0.8
Clothing 3.9 3.1 3.4 2.7 2.6
Hats, except cloth
& millinery 0.3 0.3 0.3 .0.1
Men's & boys' clothing,




& rubber 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.3
Millinery 0.3 0.3 0.2









Textiles and their products
(cont.)
Cotton + silk & rayon
+ woolen & worsted
goods + textiles,
n.e.c. (15.4)(11.7)(9.5) (5.3)
3.Leather & leather products 6.8 4.6 3.0 1.1 1.0
Boots&shoes 1.9 1.4 1.2 0.6
Other leather products 4.9 3.2 1.8 0.5
Leather, tanned, cur-
ried, & finished 3.2 2.4 1.3 0.3
Leather products, n.e.c.1.8 0.8 0.5 0.2
4. Rubber products 0.3 0.6 2.1 1.8 1.8
5.Forest products 17.612.9 6.8 3.8 3.7
Sawmills & planing
mill products 10.7 7.7 4.3 2.4 2.3
Other wood products 6.9 5.2 2.5 1.4 1.4
Wooden containers 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.2
Woodproducts,n.e.c. 5.7 4.3 2.0 1.3
6.Paper, pulp, & products 1.9 2.6 3.3 3.3 3.3
Paper, pulp, & paper-
board mills 1.6 2.0 2.5 2.2
Paper bags, containers,
& boxes 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6
Other paper products 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
7.Printing, publishing, &
allied industries 3.0 4.6 3.3 3.4 3.3
Book & job, including
lithography 2.5 1.6 1.3 1.!
Newspaper & periodicals
a 2.6 1.7 1.8









8. Chemicals & allied
products 4.3 5.0 6.0 8.1 8.1
Chemicals proper, acids,
compounds, etc. 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.4
Fertilizers 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.3
Allied chemical
substances 2.2 2.7 3.1 5.4
Drugs, medicines, &
cosmetics 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.1
Soaps & cleaning & pol-
ishing preparations0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
Paints & varnishes 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8
Other chemical
substances 0.8 1.0 1.3 3.0
9. Petroleum refining 0.8 1.1 3.0 13.7 13.9
10. Stone, clay, & glass products3.2 4.0 3.6 2.8 2.8
Cement, lime, & concrete
products 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.9
Clay & pottery products 1.4 1.8 1.2 0.5
Glass & glass products 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6
Cut stone & products 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.1
Stone, clay, & glass
products, n.e.c. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7
Metals&metalproducts 21.125.635.9 35.4 35.9
11. Iron&steel&theirproducts9.8 9.114.5 11.9 12.4
Iron & steel 7.9 6.911.4 8.7
Blast furnaces, steel
works, & rolling
mills 7.1 6.0 9.0 5.6
Ordnance & accessories0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2
Tin cans & other
tinware 0.6 0.5
Iron&steel,n.e.c. 0.5 0.6 1.2 2.4
Metal building materials









Iron and steel & their
products (cont.)
Hardware, tools, etc. 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.1
12. Nonferrous metals & their
products 2.4 3.5 3.9 3.0 3.2
Clocks, watches, & parts 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Jewelry, silverware &
plating 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3
Smelting, refining, &
alloying 0.7 2.0 2.4 2.1
Nonferrousmetal prod-
ucts, n.e.c. 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.4
13. Machinery, not including
transportation equipment 8.611.012.0 13.4 13.2
Electrical machinery &
equipment & radios 0.1 1.0 2.5 4.4 4.4
Agricultural machinery 2.2 1.9 0.9 1.6
Office equipment 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7
Factory, household &
misc. machinery 6.1 7.8 8.2 6.7
14. Transportation equipment 0.4 2.0 5.3 7.0 7.2
Motor vehicles, complete
or parts 0.4 4.2 5.2 5.1
Locomotives & railroad
equipment 0.4 1.6 1.1 0.8
Aircraft & parts
b 1.0
15. Miscellaneous manufactures1.8 1.9 2.0 2.7 3.0
Professional, scientific,
photographic, & opti-
cal instruments 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9
Misc. manufactures, n.e.c.1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8
aNotcovered by the Census of 1880.
bLessthan one-tenth of one per cent.
Source: Based on data described in Section 1.
39manufacturing industries (Table 7). We have selected 1880 the first
year for which reliable statistics are available, the beginning of the
century, and years that closely follow the termination of World Wars I
and II. For these particular years it is possible to distinguish 65 minor
industries.
Even by 1900 the industries that had been among the first to be
mechanized were losing ground to familiar commodities then newly
produced by the factory system with mechanical power and manipula-
tion and to newly developed products. Thus the textile, leather, and
forest products industries failed to expand as rapidly as all manufactur-
ing industries on the average. Capital in these three major industry
groups constituted 45 per cent of all manufacturing capital in 1880 and
34 per cent at the turn of the century. Within these old industries new
branches were emerging, particularly in textiles, as a result of the
transfer of household activities to the factory. This was the case with
women's, children's, and infants' clothing and knit goods, and these
two minor industries had a better than average rate of expansion
between 1880 and 1900.
The same sort of transfer explains the relative rise in food products;
bakery products, canning, and slaughtering and meat packing were
being rapidly shifted from the household to the market economy. Mill-
ing, on the other hand, which had been a factory process for many
decades, declined sharply in relative importance during these two
decades.
The largest relative expansion occurred in new industries that were
still at the threshold of tremendous growth: transportation equipment;
electrical machinery and equipment; metal building materials and sup-
plies; smelting, refining, and alloying of nonferrous metals; cement,
lime, and concrete products; paper bags, containers, and boxes; and
rubber products. In the succeeding twenty-year period it was this very
same group of industries together with petroleum refining and iron and
steel that expanded rapidly —nearlydoubling their share of manufac-
turing capital, from 15.5 per cent in 1900 to 29.9 in 1919. The old
industries —textile,leather, and forest products —continuedin a state
of relative decline, accounting for a third of the total in 1900 and a
quarter in 1919.
Some of the industries with a better than average rate of capital
40expansion before 1919 had a less than average rate by 1948. This was
true of the basic metal industries, both ferrous and nonferrous, and
rubber tires and tubes. Some of the metal-using industries, on the other
hand, such as electrical machinery and equipment including radios and
television sets; automobiles; airplanes; office equipment; professional,
scientific, and optical instruments; and metal building materials and
supplies continued to expand at a better than average rate. However,
by all odds the largest relative gains occurred in petroleum refining,
while the increased share of chemical and allied products was also
impressive.26
The paper and printing industries accounted for about the same per
cent of manufacturing capital in 1948 as in 1919. Food and kindred
products as a group declined in relative importance, although the minor
industries of canning and deep-freezing and tobacco products continued
their capital formation at a faster rate than that for all manufacturing
industries. The old established industries continued to wane, using only
a seventh of all manufacturing capital in 1948 compared with a fourth
in 1919. Indeed, the decline in leather and forest products had pro-
ceeded to the point where in absolute terms (constant prices) less capital
was being utilized after World War II than after World War I. In
textiles the rise of synthetic fabrics, which cannot be shown separately,
failed to offset the relative and absolute loss of capital in the primary
textile industries. Throughout this period the only textile industry
of growing importance in terms of capital was the manufacture of
women's, children's, and infants' clothing.
To summarize the trends in the stock of capital over this seventy-year
period, the older industries such as textile, leather, and forest products
have declined in importance while the newer ones such as the metal-
producing and using industries, chemicals, and petroleum refining have
increased in importance. Do these differential rates of growth help to
explain differential movements in capital-output ratios? We shall ex-
plore this possibility after we establish the trends in the capital-output
ratios.
The inclusion of investment in emergency facilities in 1948 does not alter the
basic trends.
413
Trends in Capital-Output Ratios
Capital-output ratios in reported and constant values for
all manufacturing, 1880-1948
Theamount of capital invested per dollar of output rose steadily from
1880 to 1914, according to the record of reported values (capital in
book values and output in current prices; see Chart 2 and Table 8). The
amount of capital invested per output dollar began to fall in 1914 and
continued until 1948. The capital-output ratio for 1919 was sharply
CHART2
Ratios of Capital to Value of Product
in Reported, 1929, and Current Values and
of Capital to Value Added (1929 Prices)
All Manufacturing, Selected Years, 1 880-1948
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m r.TABLE 8
Ratiosof Capital to Output in Reported,1929, and Current Values
and ofCapitalto Value Added (1929 Prices)
All Manufacturing, Selected Years, 1880-1948
RATIOSOF
Capital Capital
Capital (in 1929 (in currentCapital (in
(book value) prices) prices) to 1929 prices)
to Output to OutputOutput (in to Value
(in current (in 1929 current Added (in
Benchmark prices) prices) prices) 1929 przces)
Years (1) (2) (3) (4)
1880 .528 .547 .489 1.506
1890 .679 .730 .670 1.651
1900
Comparablewith
preceding years .748 .803 .795 1.878
1900
Comparable with
following years .743 .794 .790 1.882
1904 .815 .891 2.093
1909 .851 .972 .900 2.321
1914 .894 1.008 2.460
1919 .688 1.022 .873 2.555
1929 .829 .885 .867 2.020
1937 .744 .741 .787 1.809
1948 .532 .648 .621 1.655
Source:
Column 1Appendix Table A-i.
2 Appendix Table A-2.
3 & 4 Based on underlying data and methods of price adjustment described in
Section 1.
below the peak ratio because the inflation of product prices greatly
exceeded the inflation of capital book values. Similarly, the inflation of
post-World War II caused a sharp drop in the ratios between 1937 and
1948. Contributory factors were the unusually high rate of capacity
utilization and the inability of management to expand capacity to
desired levels because of continued shortages.
The 1937 ratio is of critical importance in establishing the downward
trend. Although business activity in 1937 was at a cyclical peak, there
is considerable evidence for believing that the rate of capacity utilization
43in 1937 was less than that in 1929. If this were the only factor that had
changed, one would expect the 1937 ratio to be higher than the 1929
ratio; the fact that it is lower suggests. that other factors were operative.
Since price changes are incorporated more rapidly into value of
output than into book value of capital, this distortion should be elimi-
nated for a true perspective. This is most effectively accomplished by
expressing both output and book values of capital in constant (1929)
prices. Introduction of the constant price base raises the level of the
ratios for 1919 and 1948 and produces smoother trend movements.
With the elimination of price changes (but not revaluation of capital
assets), the capital-output ratio rises until 1919 and at a faster rate than
the uncorrected ratio, declining thereafter until 1948 but at about the
same rate as the uncorrected ratio.27
On this evidence we can say that manufacturing has developed along
the following course: In the earlier decades an increasing fraction of
a dollar of capital was used to produce a dollar of output; in more
recent decades a decreasing fraction of a dollar of capital has been
sufficient to produce a dollar of output. This is consistent with the inter-
pretation that in the earlier decades capital innovations on balance
probably served more to replace other factor inputs than to increase
output. More recently the balance has been in the other direction
capital innovations serve more to increase the efficiency of capital,
hence to increase output, than to replace other factor inputs.
Effectof data deficienciesontrend
Theapparent reversal in the trend of the capital-output ratio is our
cardinal finding and it is important, therefore, that its empirical validity
be above challenge. For this reason we consider the probable impact on
this result of some of the deficiencies in the data and in our procedures.
The reversal in trend cannot be attributed to the adjustment for
price changes because the reversal also appears in the ratios based on
Another way to minimize price distortion is to relate capital in current prices
(i.e., replacement Cost) to output in current prices. This procedure has the advan-
tage of reducing the errors of estimate, since no adjustments are made to the reported
value of output. It is significant that the path traced by the ratios in current prices
is very similar to the one traced by the ratios in constant prices except for 1919
(Chart 2 and Table 8, column 3).
44reported values. Moreover, the adjustment for price changes alters the
ratios in the direction demanded by logic. Some might argue that the
appropriate denominator of the capital-output ratio is value added by
manufacturing in order to eliminate interfirm transactions from the
value of product. Since there is some merit in this claim, we show also
in Chart 3 the relationship of capital to value added, both in constant
prices. This ratio, too, traces virtually the same pattern as the ratio of
capital to output. If we substitute the output indexes prepared by
Frickey and Fabricant for our own estimates of output in constant
prices, the resulting ratios show a definite reversal in direction begin-
fling in 1909 instead of 1919 (Chart 3).
CHART3
Indexes of Ratios of Capital to Value of Product









If the downward movement in the ratios between 1919 and 1929 is
suspect because of the shift in the source of our data —fromCensus
of Manufactures to Statistics of Income —wepoint to the continued
decline in the ratios between 1929 and 1948, when the ratios for all
years are based on data from Statistics of Income.
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Ratio scaleon the trend in capital-output ratios is difficult to assess because of
serious gaps in our information, some important conclusions can be
made with certainty. There have been, for example, no significant
changes in the treatment of depreciation beginning with 1919. There-
fore the declining movement in the capital-output ratios after 1919
cannot be due to changes in the treatment of depreciation.28
What of the rising trend in the ratios between 1880 and 1909? There
is no reason for believing that any important shift in the practice of
depreciation accounting occurred before the inception of the corporate
income tax, i.e. before 1909. Whatever bias stems from the situation,
however, serves to minimize the rise in the capital-output ratio and thus
to strengthen the firmness of our finding. If one believes, as we do, that
capital was reported on an increasingly net basis as formal depreciation
accounting became more widespread, the rise in the capital-output ratio
is understated. Between 1909 and 1914 this conservative bias should
be pronounced because of the widespread acceptance of depreciation
accounting following the introduction of the corporate income tax. If
capital expenditures treated as operating expenditures were excluded
from the reported figures on invested capital in 1909 and earlier years,
the level of the capital-output ratios in those years would be lower than
the "true" level. The trend of the ratios to 1909 would not be affected
unless there was a trend in the percentage of these expenditures to the
stock of capital. Since the important changes in capital accounting in
manufacturing occurred after 1909, we conclude that there probably
was no strong trend in this direction and that the estimates of capital-
output ratios have a conservative bias.
Can the rise in the ratios between 1900 and 1904 be attributed to
the inflation of capital assets resulting from the mergers of that period?
Undoubtedly part of the rise can be traced to this development. Mergers
were most important in iron and steel and their products and in tobacco
products, and these were the only industries in which the rise in the
capital-output ratios based on reported values from 1900 to 1904 was
spectacularly large —anincrease of 39 per cent for iron and steel and
their products and of 133 per cent for tobacco.29 However, even if we
Forthe effect of another aspect of depreciation during recent decades, see
pp. 47-48 below.
The relative importance of mergers in major industry groups is• measured by relat-
ing the cumulative authorized capital stock by major groups as reported by Myron
46exclude these two major groups from the computation, the capital-
output ratio for 1904 is still 4 per cent higher than the 1900 ratio, and
for 1909 the ratio is 10 per cent above 1900. Including these two major
groups the percentage increases were 10 and 15. This suggests that not
all of the rise between 1900 and 1904 and 1909 can be explained by
promoters' revaluation of assets of industrial combinations.
Thus the rising trend in the ratios between 1880 and 1909-1919 is
no accounting mirage; and the declining trend after 1919 cannot be
attributed merely to the shift in depreciation practices.
What can be said of the biases in the capital estimates based on
Statistics of Income, which include intangible assets such as patent
rights and good will in the estimates for 1929 and later years? Exclu-
sion of these intangible assets in the earlier years has the effect of
raising the level of the ratios for 1929 and after. Our finding of a
decline in the capital-product ratios for this period is not, therefore,
affected by the slight shift in the definition of capital.
Another element of incomparability is the fact that the ratios for
1929, 1937, and 1948 are based on balance sheet data of corporations
only, while the ratios for earlier years are based on data for all firms,
incorporated and unincorporated alike. Unincorporated firms have
smaller assets per firm than the average corporation and, as we show
in Section 6, the smaller the firm, the smaller the capital-output ratio80
This element of incomparability gives an additional conservative bias
to our results.
And this is also the effect on the 1948 ratio of our treatment of the
wartime emergency facilities subject to accelerated amortization. We
assume that these facilities are subject only to normal depreciation, but
because of the specialized character of some of them the rate of obso-
lescence must have been above average. Thus the 1948 estimate of
W. Watkins (Industrial Combinations and Public Policy (Houghton Muffin, 1927],
Appendix H) to the 1905 Census of Manufactures figure on capital by major
groups. In iron and steel and their products authorized capital stock was 98 per cent
of census capital in 1904 and in tobacco products 128 per cent. For all other indus-
tries authorized capital stock amounted to one-third of capital reported in the
1905 CenSUS.
80Unincorporatedfirms accounted for 8.5 per cent of value added in manufacturing
in 1929 and for 8.1 in 1947. See Censuses of Manufactures for these years.
47capital is overstated by a small amount, and on this score, too, the
"true" capital-output ratio would be slightly lower than our estimate.
During the more recent decades depreciation accounting beclouds
our view of the secular movement of capital. Some argue, for example,
that statutory depreciation charges are based on length-of-life estimates
that are too low. That is, the depreciation charges are too high and
consequently net capital is understated. In this view the understatement
becomes progressively larger as the stock of capital expands. Could this
understatement cause the decline in the capital-output ratio after 1929?
This possibility can be explored by adding the amount of the under-
statement of the stock of capital in each benchmark year to the reported
values and then computing the capital-output ratios. However, there
is no estimate of the amount of the understatement, and we are obliged
to assume varying amounts of understatement. Let us start with the
extreme assumption that there is no capital consumption and that the
understatement is equal to the entire depreciation reserve. What are
the resulting ratios?
The ratios of gross total capital to output (both in constant prices)
are 1.199, 0.998, and 0.856 for 1929, 1937, and 1948. Under this ex-
treme assumption the downward trend is clear and substantial, and it
would be pointless to experiment with smaller amounts of understate-
ment of net capital. Therefore, the downward trend of the ratios based
on capital net of depreciation cannot be attributed to a progressive
understatement of the net capital accounts.
Our appraisal of the statistical materials we are obliged to use fails
to disclose any weakness of a magnitude that shakes our confidence
in the validity of the trend in the capital-output ratios, particularly
when our interest is centered in the broad pattern of movement.
The ratios we have presented thus far are based on aggregative data
—fixedand working capital combined, all industries, and all firms
regardless of size. Can the reversal in the trend of the ratios be caused
by the shifting importance of the components of the aggregates? For-
tunately there is sufficient evidence for definitive answers on the first
two types of change (type of assets and industry shifts), and we turn
now to this evidence.
48